Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. 
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I. Why Read This Essay?
You should read this essay because it examines how the U.S. military can win support for the National Military Strategy of the United States in an age of international and national uncertainty. You should read it because it will propose some new approaches to making the military matter when many think the military is no longer relevant. And finally, you should read this essay because it may help prevent some historian years from now writing of our times and saying: '"Fhey lost it all."
Life just isn't what it used to be. We used to have an enemy; we used to have clearly defined threats. Our political, economic, and military and foreign policies were all centered on containing commnnism. Capabilities necessary to meet this threat were determined; then forces needed for these required capabilities were built_ Objectives -threats -strategycapability -forces: that was the orderly manner of the military programming and budget process for decades.
Now we find the future isn't what it used to be either. First the Berlin Wall falls.
"I~nen Germany unites. Next the Warsaw Pact disappears. Democracies break out in central and eastern Europe. Finally even the Soviet Union disintegrates. Two years ago 1.5 million NATO and Warsaw Pact troops faced each other across the West German border, this year less than half that number will remain. "By the grace of God, America won the Cold War,"
proclaimed President Bush in his State of the Union Address.
At the same time, America's ability to compete economically has been slowly but visibly declining. In our efforts to maintain a standard of living, we are running the world's largest international trade deficit and have become the world's biggest debtor nation. Our domestic investment rate is only half that of Japan and well below all other international competitors. Our savings rate is the lowest of any industrialized country. Paul Kennedy uses these economic problems to predict that the American share of world manufacturing will steadily decline in a relative sense. The resulting strain between available resources and political and military commitments will cause the United States to lose its 'great power' status.
Kennedy feels tough decisions will have to be made between immediate military security and long range economic security. 4
As Alvin Toffler noted in his book The Strategy must be sold as relevant to the people, to the press, and to the politicians of Congress. Different relationships will be needed with all of these groups. To prove the need for new approaches, the age of uncertainty will be examined from the viewpoint of old and new realities: geostrategic, political, economic, and military. Then specific recommendations will be made on how to improve relations with each of the three groups: the people, the press, and members of Congress.
Listed below is a summary of new ideas discussed in this essay: fervor. To ensure sovereignty governments often sought to influence or control the polices of other countries using either dominant political or military power to achieve their goals.
For centuries, national power was created and exercised based on a set of forces that dominated the world political scene. These forces placed great weight on the abilities and desires of national leaders, the policies of the governments they led, and the economic and military power at their disposal. Old realities centered on the following: *The most powerful forces shaping the world were those controlled by national governments.
*Most power was political power underwritten by economic and military power.
*Political, economic, and military powers were mostly invested in national governments and exercised through government policy.
*The political leadership of national governments had tremendous power to shape through their national policies the political, cultural, and economic development of the world. 7
The dominance of these old realities meant that the quality of the national leaders, their economic and political persuasions, the size of the military they controlled, and the natural economic resources available to them all combined to control international events.
There was an order to things. National goals, threats, and policies were generally well known and predictable. There were global and regional superpowers who for the most part controlled the world.
New Realities
General Powell has observed: "The form and substance (of the old international order) Restrictive Wade policies can delay the demise of uncompetitive industries, but the costs will accumulate and one day become unbearable. For political reasons, government leaders must now be primarily concerned with keeping their country competitive. They no longer set policies by themselves. Market forces are now in control.
These forces are changing our national objectives. The National Security
Strategy of the United States set by the President has "a healthy and growing economy..." as the number two goal --just after survival as a free and independent country. As the 21st century approaches, achieving the first objective will depend more and more on reaching the second. The next section of this essay will examine how the military can better present its missions and relevance in this democratic age of rapid information and economic power. It will show how the National Military Strategy can better support the National Security Strategy.
III. Making the National Military Strategy Matter
The Democratic Debate
As a democracy is designed to do, there is currently a major debate over how the new realities should affect military force levels in the future. Without a Soviet threat and with a weak national economy, Americans are asking why national resources should not be diverted from defense to areas where the new realities are threatening our domestic security.
The question is a good one and will be asked continually as long as major military The new realities are upon us. We must show that the military at a Base Force level is still relevant. If opinions like those above are widespread, then the military will be faced with drawdowns similar to the ones done too rapidly after the World Wars, Korea, and Vietnam_ To make a force level argument convincingly, the armed forces will have to expand the National Military Strategy beyond traditional missions and at the same time forge new relationships with the American people, press, and politicians in Congress. Let's look at each of these areas closely and determine what specific actions we can take to prevent an "us vs. them" debate.
New Military Missions
The National Military Strategy states that lhe fundamental objective of America's Armed Forces will remain cons "tant: "to deter aggression and, should deterrence fail, to defend the nation's vital interests against any potential foe."t4 To accomplish this, four strategy foundations have been articulated:
• Strategic Deterrence and Defense: The threat of global ballistic missile and nuclear weapons proliferation is on the rise. We need a force capable to deter or to eliminate the threal.
• Forward Presence: Overseas deployed forces demonstrate our commitment, lend credibility to alliances, enhance regional stability, and provide crisis-response capability.
• Crisis Response: We need forces to respond on short notice ,and unilateraUy if necessary, to regional contingencies.
• Reconstitution: A credible capability must be preserved to forestall any potential adversary from competing militarily with the United States. International threats need to be addressed in ways that show why American involvement is necessary. Simple calls for international stability are not enough unless the threats to Americans are clearly defined. The public understands the need for oil from the Middle East; so they also understand that forces are necessary to insure our oil supply is not stopped. The public understands the threat of uncontrolled nuclear proliferation, so they support strategic forces to deter aO~k. What is not so clear is why hundreds of thousands of U.S. forces still need to be stationed overseas; or why the size of the armed forces cannot be reduced si~nif'tcantly and still provide a capable defense. These questions will have to be answered convincingly through the press and through local contacts.
The domestic needs of the country will vary over the years, so the military will have to be more flexible in adopting new missions that support domestic efforts. In providing for the common defense, unconventional domestic threats will need to be addressed by the military, as will international challenges. Keeping the world open to American trade and maintaining international political stability will mean little ff the United States is not competitive in the world markets.
I1
Convincing the public, the press, and Congress that both the old and the new missions are worth the inveslraent of scarce resourc,~ remains a significant challenge. The following sections will address some proposats on how best to approach this challenge in the new age of uncertainty.
A New Partnership with the People
The military over the next decade is going to have to make special efforts to keep close ties to Americans. If the relevance of a base force is to be convincing, grass roots approval is needed. The citizen-soldier concept needs to be maintained whatever the cost.
Since World War I, the military has maintained a close relationship with its fellow citizens through a number of means: the reserves; a large number of veterans from World War II, Korea and Vietnam; and frequent news media coverage of events where the military was in action. From threats of a Soviet nuclear or conventional attack to daily reports of the Cold War, America's focus was frequently on the military. These former means of keeping Americans in touch with their armed forces and aware of its strategy may no longer be available in the coming years.
If the reserve system is significantly reduced, if Americans read or see little about their military in the media, and if the number of home town boys in the armed forces is so limited that many people don't ever know of someone in service, then the military is in danger of becoming a secluded, invisible lot who will not gain public support until an emergency arises. Given inevitable budget cuts, dedicated efforts need to be made to keep the military ill contact with American citizens. There are three main areas to concentrate our focus:
• Educating the public on the Military Strategy and required force levels • Involving the public in military activities to keep it informed • Cooperating with the public in areas previously determined to be outside traditional military missions; being constructive as well as destructive
In educating the public, commanders of units and bases need to assume a larger share of the responsibility in educating local people and media. No longer can the job be done by public affairs representatives and senior officers alone --the magnitude of effort is tot) large.
Commanders need to spend more time becoming involved with local organizations, ensuring they understand the overall military mission, and not just the local unit's function. Second, we must keep Americans involved in their military. If active duty forces are to be cut in large portions, then the reserve system needs to be maintained at a high level.
Even if the cost effectiveness of the reserve force is low, we still need that contact between active forces and citizen soldiers. For over 200 years the militia/reserve concept on which our country was founded has served us well, developing a military-government-people tradition unsurpassed in history. That relationship needs to be kept alive.
In the future, the reserve system need not adhere exactly to the traditional concept. 
A New Partnership with the Press
Joint Publication One, Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces, recognizes clearly the need to relate to the media:
"We in the U.X Armed Forces must account for our actions with the American people whom we serve, by dealing openly and well with the representatives of the nation's free press. "'ts
Our free press, both when it accompanies soldiers into baOle and when it covers peacetime strategy debates, performs a unique role. It serves as an eyewitness; it forges a bond between the citizen and the soldier; and it generally strives to avoid manipulation either by the government or by critics of the government through accurate, independent reporting.
It also provides one of the checks and balances that sustains the confidence of the American people in their armed forces.1~
The new reality of the information revolution has made relationships between the press and military a critical part of strategic planning. Popular support for the military depends more on this relationship today than at any time in the past_ The last really patriotic war was World War II, when, after Pearl Harbor, public opinion and the press rallied behind the nation's armed forces. Trust and cooperation were the prevailing rules of the era. Since since the antagonistic atmosphere developed during the Vietnam War. As a result, at
Grenada the press was barred from covering early stages of the attack. In the Persian Gulf some commanders deliberately avoided the press and refused to allow them on unit operations. While some leadership in the military has matured in its press relations, the average field commander has not. tie is suspicious, uneasy, and reserved in the presence of the press. After the Persian Gulf War, Rear Admiral Riley D. Mixon, Commander Battle
Force Red Sea, on the USS John F. Kennedy, said, "We must learn to play the press better.
We tend to avoid them. ,,is
The press is likewise suspicious of the military and the government because of historical lies and efforts to prevent the press from performing its duties: The new realities will require a consistent approach to media relations if the American people are to approve modem military strategies and force levels. The good press-military relations developed in some Desert Storm units showed that it is possible for both the media and armed forces to accomplish their missions simultaneously. The units which had the attitude of "trust the troops to tell their own story" proved that relations can have trust and cooperation. Get the press out with the soldiers and sailors; let them see what they do; don't place too many rules on what can and cannot be reported. Mistakes cannot be hidden forever. Let the press tell it like it is.
Press relations lessons of Desert Shield/Storm provided good guidelines on how to improve media relations in the age of uncertainty. We should keep these main Iindings in mind:
• The high-tech news media with instant communications required guidelines different from past wars. Absolute open access is n_o_t possible when the enemy is watching CNN. The press needs to understand this. Most of them do.
• The huge number of media people covering the war posed major logistic and security problems. In Vietnam there were about 700 accredited reporters incountry. In Saudi Arabia there were 1,600. Pre-planned procedures are necessary to handle large numbers.
• Commanders must give more attention to accommodating the news media.
Dedicated transportation to remote units needs pre-operation planning.
• In this information age, if press representatives are not available, local commanders should use Combat Camera Groups or unit assets to cover events of interesL 21
In addition to these battle tested lessons, there are other areas where the militarypress relationship can be improved in the peacetime environment:
• Always tell the truth. Establish integrity as the foundation of the relationship. 'Fell the good news and the bad news. Don't try to use the press to put an untruthflfl spin on an event.
• Establish a formal media training course for commanders. Teach military leaders to be aggressive, unafraid, and truthful in press relations. Provide them an appreciation of the needs of the press and a realization of the commander's responsibility to assist the media in their jobs. Require commanders to attend this course prior to assuming command.
• Establish a formal joint media orientation course. Set up a schedule of joint briefs and base or ship visits to acquaint the media with the joint organization, strategy, capability and procedures. Let them see first hand the challenges, rewards and frustrations. This would not be a propaganda effort but rather a means of providing the press a background on which to base future reports. We should aggressively encourage the national media to attend this course.
eR_ eport on media efforts in commanders' fitness reports. Performance in coordinating media relations has become a major responsibility. Efforts to expose the press to the military can no longer be left to just the public affairs officers.
We can build on Desert Shield/Storm if we take the initiative and maintain our integrity. Democracy survives on a free press and an informed public. We need to remember that during military operations. As the Chief of Naval Information recently observed:
"The reason a busy commander must learn to practice good media relations skills in war or in peace is not for personal publicity or gratification, but for recognition for our people -to tell their story to our families and the general public. ,~2
A New Relationship with Comjress
In addition to working in new ways with the American people and press, the armed forces must develop better working relationships with Congress. The antagonistic atmosphere has grown so large in recent years that "dead-on-arrival" is now the annual comment made by members on the Presidenfs defense budget. Beyond the budget debate, there is also a major gap in opinions on the direction our national military strategy should take in the future. These major differences are detrimental to maintaining an adequate This lack of understanding and lack of trust between the executive and legislative branches of government needs to be corrected. "In the long run," says Aaron Friedberg of Princeton University, "reestablishing a consensus on the various aspects of policy will be the key to improving the country's strategic performance. ,,24 The solutions are not complex, but they entail a willingness to change some traditional ways of doing business. Three actions are recommended to improve the levels of understanding and trust:
• Establish a high level, three day annual retreat for senior defense and legislative decision makers
• Include Members of Congress in Defense budget development process
• Conduct a week long joint military orientation course for Congress and staff
Other than formal testimony, a few lunches, and social meetings, there appear to be few opporttmities for defense leaders and members of Congress to really talk with each other. we need to work with the nation's media to instill mutual trust and better understanding; we need to establish a more cooperative atmosphere with Congress based on greater exchanges of opinions; and we need to work in a more formal manner to expose Congress to military strategies and capabilities.
The United States military is going to have to aggressively take the lead in maintaining relevancy if it is to avoid the political paralysis that has pervaded much of the rest of government. Initiative has long been an American characteristic. We need to use it now to build a better bond between the armed forces and the citizens of the United States.
New missions and relationships are the only way to obtain a capable base force that executes a well-supported military strategy. They can also insure the success of our National Security
Strategy
Winston Churchill once observed that Americans can always be counted on to do the right thing --after all the othc~r possibilities have been exhausted. In taking the lead, we may avoid the alternatives.
